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The Half-industrial and Halfagricultural Working Structure in
Rural China
Yang Hua*

Abstract:

The half-industrial and half-agricultural working structure in rural
China is a key phenomenon supporting China’s industrialization and
urbanization. Based on inter-generational division of labor, the current
half-industrial and half-agricultural working structure has given birth
to the elderly agriculture and mainstay agriculture, the latter of which
has gone out of agricultural involution and to some extent changed
the management philosophy of traditional agriculture, becoming a key
direction of China’s agricultural development. Such a structure has also
shaped the “new three-generation family” and facilitated the expansion
of middle-income rural groups. While supporting long-term farmers in
rural China, it also paves the way for China’s urbanization. This structure
plays a significant role in the economic, political and social development of
rural China. Therefore, this structure is a rural economic structure which
concerns farmers’ income structure and livelihood patterns. Meanwhile,
it is also a rural political structure, village structure and family structure.
Through development and refinement, the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure in rural China has far extended the scope
of a descriptive concept. As a dominant variable, the structure, along
with its derivatives, through permutation and combination, can establish
logical relationships and an interpretation chain among a variety of major
economic, political and social phenomena in rural China. Therefore, it can
expect to be constructed into an analyticity-oriented mid-level concept.

Keywords: rural structure; half-industrial and half-agricultural; inter-generational
division of labor; new three-generation family; middle-income group

* This article attempts to summarize the discussions on the rural half-industrial and half-agricultural structure by Professor He
Xuefeng and the Central China School of Rural Studies.
* Yang Hua, School of Marxism, Huazhong University of Science & Technology.
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1. Issues raised

D

uring China’s rapid moder nization
and urbanization, its vast rural areas
played the roles of “impounding reservoir” and
“stabilizer.” Unlike Western Europe or the other
developing countries over the past decades, China’s
modernization and urbanization hasn’t been
accompanied with such tragedies as “sheep eats up
men” or “a large number of farmers are compelled
to leave their home.” Besides, there is no such
scenario as the drastic decline of rural area or the
emergence of large slums across cities. In other
words, the urbanization of the West and the other
developing countries are invariably accompanied
with the decline of rural areas and the end of the
farmers’ era. However, China proves to be an
exception, which has a lot to do with its series of
institutions, policies and social arrangements, such
as institutional urban-rural dual structures, collective
ownership of rural lands, abolishment of agricultural
taxes, the policy of “strengthening agriculture and
benefiting farmers,” effective rural grass-roots
units and rural community-based construction of
a new socialist countryside. Such institutions and
social arrangements have reshaped the relationships
between the country and its rural society, and also
adjusted and improved the relationships between the
rural and urban areas. In the meantime, they have
been included, internalized and reformed by the
rural societies and have been embodied in the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure in
rural China.
Gradually developing and stabilizing since
China’s Reform and Opening-up, this half-industrial
and half-agricultural working structure in rural
China is based on the collective ownership of
rural land, the urban-rural dual structure, as well
as the traditional rural family system. This halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure,
102

primarily relying on inter-generational division
of labor at present, brings about an occupational
division between generations within a family. More
specifically, the younger generation are away from
home as migrant workers while the middle-aged
and elderly members stay at home for agricultural
production. In this way, a family can expect to enjoy
two income sources, i.e. industrial income and
agricultural income. In fact, the half-industrial and
half-agricultural working structure is concerning
economy, society, family, as well as politics. The
forming and stabilizing of such a structure has
exerted a decisive impact on China’s economic
development and social stability. For example, it
provides an endless cheap labor force to facilitate
urbanization and transform rural China into a rear
area for eliminating urban crises. Also, it manages to
deliver a profound impact on rural China’s economic
development and social and political structure.
The existing academic research into the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure
mainly focuses on agroeconomics, or farmers’
income structure (Huang, 2006). Being stable
and institutionalized, the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure is no longer an
isolated existence. Instead, it frequently interacts
with the other rural economic and social structures
in which it is embedded. This paper attempts to
conduct a preliminary analysis of the half-industrial
and half-agricultural working structure in rural
China to unveil its agroeconomical connotation and
social and political significance, and tries to interpret
and construct it as a mid-level concept.

2. The development, characteristics
and connotation of the halfindustrial and half-agricultural
working structure in rural China
Rural China falls into two categories. One is the
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resource and wealth-intensive category, exemplified
by coastal and suburb rural areas. These areas have
already been integrated into urban areas, with their
agricultural land incorporated in the scope of urban
development. The majority of farmers, no longer
engaging in agricultural production, mainly rely on
revenue from industrial work, business, as well as
land and house rentals. However, those rural areas
only account for 5% of rural China, for which their
situation should not be deemed a dominant trend.
The other is the agricultural production-reliant
category. Featuring a low urbanization rate, this
category applies to the vast rural area in central and
western China. There, part of the farmers are away
from home for full-time or part-time industrial work
or trade (hereinafter referred to as industrial work).
The rest of the farmers stay at home for agricultural
production. That is how the half-industrial and halfagricultural occupational and income structures are
developed. Those rural areas account for 95% of
rural China and therefore should be deemed its main
body. It is fair to say that the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure widely exists in most
rural areas of China.
2.1 The development of the half-industrial
and half-agricultural working structure in rural
China
The origin of this structure can be traced back
to the beginning of the Reform and Opening-up in
the early 1980s. Back then, with the introduction
of “fixing farm output quotas for each household”
policy and the revival of urban markets, some
farmers began to engage in other work such as trade
and manual processing during the slack season.
However, such a structure did not really come into
being until the mid to late 1980s. Following that,
it experienced two transformations in the mid to
late 1990s and the 2000s. Now, this half-industrial
and half-agricultural working structure can be
subdivided into three categories.

2.1.1 The half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure based on the concept of departing
farming without leaving native land
In the mid to late 1980s, township enterprises
sprang up like mushrooms across rural China. It was
no exaggeration to say that “township enterprises
could be found in almost every village and every
township.” Such a boom offered a large number of
jobs to surplus rural laborers. In this context, finding
a job nearby became a trend in rural China. While
there were some young adults “leaving farmland for
factory,” they departed farming without leaving their
native land. Some of them worked at the factory
during the daytime and went home in the evening,
or they stayed at the factory only during work hours
and went home during the meal and breaks. Some
farmers did farm work during the busy farming
season and worked at the factory during the slack
season. Alternatively, they could work at a nearby
factory during daytime and did their farm work
after returning home. In this way, a sense of “work
schedule” was built among farmers. On the other
hand, some farmers failed to be recruited by any
factory and therefore could do nothing but rely
on their farmland. Such a half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure, based on the concept
of departing farming without leaving the native land,
enabled a rural family to have two income sources,
i.e. factory work and farm work and ensured rural
family unity and soundness of rural political and
social life. With a large number of young adults
staying in the rural area, there was no problem in
handling village-level public affairs and holding
public events. In other words, villages still enjoyed
a relatively sound and complete public space. In
fact, such a half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure was especially popular in coastal
developed regions.
2.1.2 Gender specific labor division based halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structures
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In the 1990s, cities gradually lifted their
restrictions on the rural labor force, and a large
number of rural migrant workers left home for
industrial work in cities. As time went by, in the mid
to late 1990s, many township enterprises declined
or even closed, forcing farmers to swarm into cities.
Farmers left home for industrial work in cities in
the 1990s were typical first-generation migrant
workers. That generation mainly comprised young
male adults, along with a small number of rural
single women①. Married rural women stayed at
home for agricultural production with their middleaged and elderly family members. That is halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure
based on inter-generational division of labor. In such
a structure male farmers, young adults, went to the
cities for industrial work while female farmers, also
young adults, stayed home to do farm work and
look after their families; middle-aged and elderly
family members helped with some housework. As
abovementioned, such inter-generational division
of labor enabled a rural family to enjoy two income
sources. As women stayed at home to look after
the elderly and the young, there was as yet no
such terms as “left-behind seniors” or “left-behind
children.” But such inter-generational division of
labor also had negative effects on rural China. First,
with large numbers of young male adults leaving
for the cities, the feminization of agriculture was
on the rise, creating a heavy burden for the rural
women. Second, young rural couples were forced to
lead an incomplete family life, an abnormal sex life
in particular. Last, living under the same roof was
likely to trigger various family disputes between
rural women and their middle-aged and elderly
family members.
2.1.3 Half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure based on inter-generational
① Female migrant workers were not approved in many rural areas until the 1990s.
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division of labor
Entering the 21st century, particularly since the
abolishment of agricultural taxes in 2006, the rural
labor force has been further liberated. The barriers
between urban and rural areas have been greatly
reduced and rural customs have been significantly
changed. It is no longer an embarrassment for
young female adults to leave home for industrial
work. Thus, it has become a norm for all rural
adults at a proper age to leave home as migrant
workers. In such a context, China has witnessed an
unprecedented migration movement with a total
of 250 million migrant workers traveling between
hometown and cities per year. During this period,
there was also an apparent change in the division
of labor within the rural family. Young rural adults,
whether married or not, leave home as migrant
workers for higher pay. Middle-aged and elderly
farmers stay at home, continuing their farm work to
gain agricultural benefits. Thus, the half-industrial
and half-agricultural working structure based on
inter-generational division of labor has gradually
developed. This division of labor has its own merits.
First, it helps to increase the income of migrant
workers and has substantially improved the living
standards of rural families. Second, working at the
same place enables young rural couples to have a
regular family life. Yet, such a division of labor is not
without problems. The absence of young couples at
home leaves their aged parents and kids uncared for,
thus giving rise to the issues of “left-behind seniors”
and “left-behind children.” Left-behind seniors are
likely to feel empty and lonely and may not be able
to find anyone for help when they are sick. This is a
key factor for the increased suicide attempts made
by rural seniors in recent years (Yang & Fan, 2009).
2.2 Major characteristics of the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working
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structure in rural China
The half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure in rural China has experienced
three decades of development. Through shifts and
adjustments, it has managed to develop into halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure
based on inter-generational division of labor. The
characteristics of this structure in rural China can be
summarized in the following three points.
2.2.1 Long–term phenomenon
The half-industrial and half-agricultural working
structure in rural China is generally accepted as a
compelling management system. The excessively
intensive agricultural system, featuring a large
agricultural population and limited arable land,
cannot generate satisfactory returns, forcing many
farmers to leave home for industrial work. On the
other hand, the risks of being migrant workers in
turn force those farmers to rely on agricultural
production to hedge such risks. For Chinese
farmers, this is indeed a compelling choice, which
is frequently criticized for being a negative outcome
of China’s institutional and policy arrangements,
particularly the longstanding institutional urbanrural dual structure. To tackle such a compelling
issue, China should break through the barriers of
this urban-rural dual structure, particularly the
household registration system so that migrant
workers can live and work in cities freely and enjoy
equal social welfare there. The abovementioned
criticism has overlooked the objective basis for the
long-term existence of the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure in rural China. This
objective basis refers to the social environment
which cannot promise migrant workers a decent
urban life even if they are offered free access to
cities. Currently, China has some 700 million
farmers in rural areas and over 200 million migrant
workers in urban areas. Given the average salary of
migrant workers and current urban living standards,

less than 10% of migrant workers have the chance to
settle down in a city and lead a decent life. The 90%
majority cannot expect to establish themselves in
cities and therefore have to continue with their halfindustrial and half-agricultural way of life. Most
of the Chinese industries remain at the low end of
the global value chain and are in the labor-intensive
processing category. There is not much left when the
already low profit is further distributed to migrant
workers. That is why their wage level has remained
fairly low for such a long time. One must realize
that urbanization in China is inevitably a longterm and gradual process, during which only truly
capable migrant workers have the chance to settle
down in cities, while the majority have to shuttle
between urban and rural area. This reality also
means that the half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure, covering 700 million farmers
in rural China and 200 million migrant workers
in urban China, is a long-term structure. The halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure
is not a temporary phenomenon, and it will remain
unchanged in future decades, exerting a significant
impact on the rural economy, politics and society.
2.2.2 Stability
At present, half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure based on inter-generational
division of labor is conditioned by a reshuffle
of the division of labor within a rural family.
Through such a reshuffle, this working structure is
gradually consolidated and stabilized. For farmers,
agricultural work generates less income than
industrial work. Even so, some farmers must stay
at home for agricultural work to ensure their basic
needs. From another perspective, what factories in
urban area really need are young adults who can
respond quickly, rather than aged adults. Under such
circumstances, migrant workers beyond a certain
age are forced to withdraw from the assembly
line. In general, for assembly line work, migrant
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workers, regardless of gender, gradually lose their
competitiveness once reaching 35 and are likely to
be replaced by their younger peers. Most migrant
workers over 40 can only expect to find a job at a
construction site or in the service sector. Migrant
workers over 50 are unlikely to find employed in any
urban sector. When it comes to the division of labor
within a family, it is more than for a young couple
to (be required to) choose work at an assembly line
for higher pay, and for middle-aged and elderly
family members (who are refused by such an
assembly line) to engage in agricultural production,
which generates less revenue. Such inter-genational
division of labor within a family will remain stable
in the long term and form a steady structure.
2.2.3 Reproducibility
The current gender division of labor based halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure
is reproductive. This is a prerequisite for its longterm stable existence, with an endless supply of
labor to support this working structure. As a young
couple grow older, they will no longer be suitable
for assembly line work and will subsequently be
replaced by younger migrant workers. When they
eventually withdraw from their urban work, they
will return home to take over the agricultural work
from their elders. By then, it will be their grownup children’s turn to go into the cities for industrial
work. In this way, the division of labor within a
family (i.e. a young couple for assembly line work
and middle aged and elderly family members for
agricultural work) is repeated in endless cycles.
This is the reproducibility of the half-industrial and
half-agricultural working structure based on gender
division of labor.
The long–ter m existence, stabilit y and
reproducibility of the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure in rural China will
also be embodied in its subordinate rural structures,
institutions and phenomena.
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2.3 The basic connotation of the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working
structure in rural China
The current half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure in rural China is a general
structure, not just an agricultural management
system or a rural family income structure, but also a
social institution (Xia, 2014). The half-industrial and
half-agricultural working structure in rural China
bears the respective connotations of rural economic
structure, social structure and political structure.
This working structure shapes and reconstructs
a new economic structure, social structure and
political structure for rural China.
2.3.1 Economic structure
First, the economic structure concerns the rural
income structure. The half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure means a rural family
has two income sources. One is industrial work,
which contributes 60%–70% of the total family
income. The other is agricultural work, which
contributes about 30%–40%. For a rural family,
the two income sources are indispensable, for they
ensure their survival and labor force reproduction.
Those elderly family members may stop doing
agricultural work and only look after their
grandchildren, or just lead an easy life at home. Even
so, they can still save significant expenses for their
family. According to such an income structure, even
with an industrial income source, a rural family still
must rely on agricultural income. To this end, the
existing rural land system must remain unchanged
in the long term. It can conduct land transfers but
large-scale land transfers with deliberate intention
are prohibited, for it enables capital to drive farmers
away from their land and results in the loss of their
agricultural income. Second, the economic structure
concerns the agricultural management system.
The half-industrial and half-agricultural working
structure determines the managing subjects of rural
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land to be middle-aged and elderly farmers, and
some young adults. Through a family management
model, farmers maintain their management scale at
“1.3 mu per capita with a maximum of 10 mu per
household.” This new management model has both
similarities and differences with traditional “small
peasant private ownership,” and it is not the same as
the capitalist model of farm management (Yu & Liu,
2013). Third, the economic structure also concerns
the occupational structure of farmers. In the vast
rural areas of central and western China, some 70%
of families’ occupational division of labor is based
on the half-industrial and half-agricultural working
structure. That is to say, half-industrial and halfagricultural families account for 70% of all rural
households there. This cannot give rise to much
occupational differentiation, which means there is
no big income gap among these farmers.
2.3.2 Social structure
Social structure includes village structure and
family structure. First, the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure requires some farmers
to leave home as migrant workers and the rest to stay
at home for agricultural production. The two groups
keep in close touch with each other. Moreover,
most migrant workers are expected to return to
their village sooner or later. In this sense, villages
remain the farmers’ final destination and still have
the capacities of value creation and social discipline.
Some 70% of rural families are within the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working framework.
There is no significant income gap among them and
they fall into the middle-income group in rural China.
(Chen, 2014). The limited economic differentiation
among farmers indicates the existence of a vast
middle-income group in rural China. This group is
of vital importance to rural social stability and can
prevent apparent social stratification there. Family
structure refers to the fact that the half-industrial and
half-agricultural working structure is a labor division

structure of the rural family, which forms stable
and fixed inter-generational division of labor and
at the same time forges a new family form, i.e. the
“new three-generation family.” Such a new family
form is nothing like traditional big families (such as
combined family and lineal family) or a Westernstyle core family. In this new family form, the young
couple, being away from home for industrial work,
still maintains a united family with their parents,
who are responsible for housekeeping, taking care
of the young, and saving money. Even so, the young
couple and their parents are independent from each
other when it comes to money management.
2.3.3 Political structure
To some extent, the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure can cause outflow
of both talents and wealth from the rural areas.
It is worth mentioning that young and vigorous
farmers capable of finding a job in town have
all left, leaving the old, the weak, the pregnant,
the young, as well as the disable at home. Under
such circumstances, a new problem arises. Who
should take charge of rural governance? This is a
question that must be answered. Due to the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working structure,
a significant number of farmers are away from
home for industrial work, leaving some farmland
unused. Through spontaneous transfer of such
unused land within a village, more and more land is
obtained by a small group of farmers. Those people
mainly rely on farmland to gain profits and focus on
enhancing interpersonal relationships within their
village. Caring about farmland-related interests and
village-based social relationships, they are willing
to participate in village governance and build
relationships. Given that, this group of farmers have
the potential to take charge of village governance
and play a crucial role in rural political life. Neither
very rich nor very poor, those farmers are of a
middle-income group in the villages. The half107
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industrial and half-agricultural working structure
rules out the possibility of rich farmers dominating
rural governance in the vast rural areas of central
and western China.

3. The agricultural economic
significance of the half-industrial
and half-agricultural working
structure in rural China
Over the past decades, China has witnessed
tremendous changes in agricultural management.
Also, attempts have been made to tackle agricultural
involution. In Huang Zongzhi’s term (2010), such
a reform is called “China’s hidden agricultural
revolution.” From a microscopic perspective, the
differentiation in village-level agricultural managing
subjects is the direct factor that triggers revolutionary
changes in Chinese agriculture. The characteristics
and capacities of these agricultural managing
subjects determine the amount of investment into
agricultural management, corresponding labor
relations, agricultural type, management models,
etc. and subsequently determine the development
direction and strategy of Chinese agriculture.
The half-industrial and half-agricultural working
structure divides farmers into farmers for industrial
production and farmers for agricultural production.
The latter forms the principal part of agricultural
management and can be subdivided into the
middle-aged and elderly groups and the mainstay
group. Their agricultural production activities are
respectively called the “elderly agriculture” and the
mainstay agriculture,” which are both interconnected
and different from each other.
3.1 The “elderly agriculture” in the halfindustrial and half-agricultural working
structure
As its name suggests, elderly agriculture refers
to an agricultural model which mainly relies on the
108

engagement of middle-aged and elderly farmers.
According to the inter-generational division of
labor in rural China, middle-aged and elderly
farmers, due to their declining physical capacity,
are left home for agricultural production. Most of
them fall into the age group of 50─65. They are
responsible for their family’s contracted farmland,
which usually covers an area of 1─20 mu. Farmland
larger than 20 mu is beyond their physical ability.
A higher level of agricultural mechanization makes
it possible for farmers to leave some heavy and
tedious manual work to mechanical equipment.
Thanks to that, farmers over the age of 70 can still
do some farm work. Their agricultural production
is of a self-employed nature and is performed based
on a family unit. Usually, it involves a middle-aged
or elderly couple and some auxiliary manpower.
Labor employment seldom happens and as
mentioned above, some manual work can be left to
mechanical equipment. During the busy farming
season, a few relatives and friends may come and
help, which is either a pure favor or a mutual help.
The purpose of their agricultural production is to
realize self-sufficiency and support their family,
rather than facilitate market exchange. Only extra
farm production is used for market exchange, which
becomes an income source for elderly agriculture’s
simple reproduction.
Basically, elderly agriculture can be regarded
as a diversified agriculture. That is because those
still capable middle-aged and elderly farmers not
just do farm work, but also do some part-time work
or other small businesses nearby during the slack
season. Considering the opportunity cost of this
diversified agriculture, elderly agriculture, though
still of an intensive farming type, is far behind
traditional agriculture in the degree of intensive and
meticulous cultivation. In terms of per mu yield,
elderly agriculture cannot compare with mainstay
agriculture, but is higher than investment supported
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agriculture (Yang, 2013). When reaching 60,
farmers can find fewer part-time jobs and elderly
agriculture is transformed into leisure agriculture.
As physical demands and labor intensity keep
reducing in agricultural production, the importance
of management and protection is highlighted.
Whenever they like, the elderly can stroll around
their field, loosening clay soil, weeding, applying
fertilizer, and catching insects. While killing time
and enriching their life, they also keep health
through such fieldwork. Thus, what elderly
agriculture values is not average profit, but growth
in per unit area yield. If their physical condition
allows, the elderly can engage in agricultural
production as they wish. Elderly agriculture enables
elderly farmers to earn their own living without
being at the mercy of their children or children-inlaw. This helps to avoid many conflicts between
the two generations. Elderly agriculture remains
an indispensable income source of a rural young
couple’s family. To a large extent, it eases the family
burden on the younger generation.
3.2 The “mainstay agriculture” in the
half-industrial and half-agricultural working
structure
The half-industrial and half-agricultural
working structure means most young male adults
are away from their village, leaving part of the
farmland in the charge of the middle-aged and
elderly farmers and the rest to the young and
middle-aged farmers who choose or who are forced
to stay in the village. Moreover, as the middle-aged
and elderly farmers grow even older, they gradually
withdraw from agricultural production, transferring
their farmland to those young and middle-aged
farmers capable of managing more farmland. Young
and middle-aged farmers refer to farmers falling
into the age group of 30─50. They are arguably the
most physically capable group in rural China. They
are mainly in charge of two types of farmland.

One is their own contracted land and the other is
the contracted land of other villagers who are away
from home for industrial work. Each of them can
manage a combined area of 20–40 mu. For the most
capable among them, the management capacity can
reach up to 100 mu. The extra farmland is mainly
transferred from relatives and friends, for which
no rent or very little rent is required. Besides, there
is no need to sign a transfer agreement. When the
owner of the entrusted land plans to return home,
and resume their agricultural trade, he or she only
needs to inform the entrusted farmer half a year in
advance.
In ter ms of cultivation scale, mainstay
agriculture ranks between elderly agriculture and
investment-supported agriculture. Its managing
subject can be called “mainstay farmer.” Mainstay
agriculture is of a family farm-based cultivation
pattern. Normally, a young couple, assisted by a
tractor and other machinery and some hired labor in
the busy farming season, can manage a total of 100
mu of farmland. Mid-level agriculture can generate a
higher yield than elderly agriculture and investment
supported agriculture. Mainstay agriculture
combines self-employment with labor employment
and is performed on a family unit basis.
Mainstay agriculture is different from elderly
agriculture in terms of management scale and
model. Elderly agriculture falls into the substance
agriculture category. With its agricultural production
linked to consumption, it pursues yields, rather than
profits. By contrast, mainstay agriculture aims to
bring its agricultural products to market, for which
its agricultural production is market-oriented. Thus,
it can be concluded that mainstay agriculture is
a commercial agricultural model which focuses
on seeking profits and at the same time gives
consideration to meeting the farmers’ own needs.
While striving to increase its per unit area yield,
mainstay agriculture also begins to raise average
109
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profits. As we know, when the per unit area input of
its factors such capital, labor force and technology
generates the maxim yield, there is bound to be a
progressive marginal benefit decrease. In that case,
the managing subject no longer invests in farmland
and begins to shift their investment interests to other
sectors. That explains why the average scale of midscale agriculture restricts its farmland area within
100 mu. After all, once its scale exceeds 100 mu, the
increased input of cultivation factors can bring about
a decline (rather than a rise) in its average profit.
Therefore, no more farmland or cultivation factors
are to be added.
As a commercial agricultural model, mainstay
agriculture can maintain its managing subject’s
passion for the use of improved varieties and the
improvement of production mode on condition that
the marginal benefit is above zero. Also, by sticking
to intensive and meticulous cultivation, mainstay
agriculture can expect higher yields and higher
profits. For a young rural couple managing 40─100
mu farm land for two seasons, they can generate

annual revenue of some 80,000 yuan to 200,000
yuan. Such annual revenue is at a high level in rural
China.
Mainstay agriculture and elderly agriculture
are interchangeable. When the practitioners of
mainstay agriculture enter the elderly group, they
cannot afford to manage mid-scale farmland any
more, and have to gradually render part of their
farmland, thus transforming their management
into elderly agriculture. Their returned land is then
transferred to other farmers and is expanded into a
mid-scale agricultural business, thus becoming part
of a mainstay agriculture operation. This is how
mainstay agriculture’s withdrawal mechanism and
reproduction mechanism work.
3.3 Comparison between elderly agriculture
and mainstay agriculture
There are both similarities and differences
between elderly agriculture and mainstay agriculture
(see Table 1). Elderly agriculture still maintains a
traditional small-scale farming system, while mainstay
agriculture is on its way to modern agriculture.

Table 1

According to relevant research, elderly
agriculture falls into the category of traditional
labor-intensive agriculture and is not primarily
profit oriented. Even so, its very existence is still a
necessity. Given that the half-industrial and halfagricultural working structure will exist in the
long term and that the differentiation of farmers
remains far from thorough, the middle-aged and
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elderly farmers cannot separate themselves from
agricultural production. Therefore, their family
should enjoy a certain agricultural surplus. Both
in terms of production efficiency and per unit area
yield, mainstay agriculture performs best of all.
Mainstay agriculture features mid-scale farmland
and corresponding investments of labor, capital
and other factors. To some extent, it still belongs
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to the labor-intensive agriculture category, but it
is also of a capital and technology-intensive one.
Mainstay agriculture pursues average profits and is
now at least half way to getting out of agricultural
involution. In this sense, it is different from
traditional small-scale agriculture. Thus, it can be
concluded that the development motive of Chinese
agricultural production originates from the (notthorough-enough) differentiation of agricultural
managing subjects, whose managing purposes,
efficiency and mode are determined by their own
characteristics and natural endowments. Mainstay
agriculture indicates a future direction for China’s
agricultural transition and development. Therefore,
China should encourage and support the transfer
of surplus farmland to the managing subjects
of minstay agriculture, and at the same time
acknowledge the rationality of elderly agriculture’s
long-term existence.

4. The political and social significance
of the half-industrial and halfagricultural structure in rural China
As an operation model, the half-industrial and
half-agricultural structure pattern’s political and
social significance to rural areas even outweigh
its implications on agricultural operations. Its
comprehensive and systemic implications to rural
politics and societies are many.
4.1 Shaping “new three-generation families”
in rural China
The traditional Chinese family patterns in
rural areas are categorized into joint families,
stem families, and nuclear families. Among them,
the nuclear families make up the biggest share,
followed by stem and joint families. The term “joint
family” refers to any family composed of two or
more couples from any generation. For instance,
a family composed of parents, their children, and

the children’s spouses and offspring, or a family
composed of siblings and their spouses who still
live in the same residence after marriage can
be identified as a joint family. As the result of
lateral expansion of nuclear families of the same
generations, a joint family is characterized by big
family size and complicated relationships. However,
its family members usually are not closely related to
each other as each basic triangle has its own center.
Therefore, joint families only happen under specific
circumstances, which are relatively rare today. A
nuclear family refers to any family composed of two
generations, parents and their unmarried children.
As the principal pattern of traditional families in
China, nuclear families are becoming more common
in modern China. A stem, or lineal, family refers
to any family composed of the parents and one
married child or their unmarried children. The stem
families are equivalent to the “three generation
families,” usually including grandparents, parents,
and unmarried children. There are two patterns
of stem families, depending on the son, whom the
parents live with─some parents would live with
the family of one of their sons (mostly the youngest
one) after the other sons have moved out, while
some would live with the family of their only son.
The three-generation families made up roughly
30% of the traditional Chinese family patterns,
with no remarkable changes in percentage until the
1980s when the share of nuclear families increased
dramatically. With more and more youngest and
only sons moving out of their parents’ houses, the
share of “three-generation families” declined to
24.29% in 1982.
I t i s a c o m m o n v i e w i n t h e wo r l d’s
industrialization processes and sociological theories
that, along with industrialization, urbanization and
the development of modern economies the midscale agricultural economies with families as their
major units will be replaced by individual industrial
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workers, and the traditional rural family patterns
by nuclear families. However, the resilience of the
three-generation family pattern is well argued in the
research related to the history of economy and law
by Huang Zongzhi (Huang, 2013). By leveraging the
findings of Huang in the historic data and literature,
I have further identified a new finding: The share of
a new family pattern─or the “new three-generation
families” defined in this article─which has emerged
along with the half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure in rural China has far outweighed the
traditional “three-generation families” in statistical
terms.
The traditional three-generation families are
defined by parents who live with the family of one
of their sons after the others have moved out or
if they live with their only son. To this end, such
a family pattern is of statistical significance only
when the households of the gray hair are registered
in the families of their offspring. Since 2000,
the half-industrial and half-agricultural family
structure, which is based on inter-generational work
divisions, has emerged in rural China, with the
young couples going out as migrant workers, and
their children usually left behind and attended by
their farming parents at home. The grandparents
will have to take care of all their sons’ families
and children. In such cases, the young couples
normally are not separated from their parents in
the terms of family lands, properties, and social
relations.① In the meantime, the outgoing migrant
couples have formed individual small families who
are independent financial units. To this end, the old
parents remain connected separately to each small
family of their sons. However, a small family in such
a family is independent from the families of their
siblings. In this sense, such a family is different from

a traditional “three-generation family” in which
parents will live with one of their sons when their
other children have moved out. The small families
in such a family pattern are all independent nuclear
families, therefore not as closely related to each other
as the ones in a traditional three-generation family
(see Figure 1). In light of this, “new three-generation
families” make up roughly 80% of the families in
rural China.

Figure 1 The “new three-generation families”
and the traditional “three-generation families”

The “new three generation families” has the
following features:
(1) The “new three-generation families” are a
result of the “half-industrial and half-agricultural
str ucture” family str ucture based on intergenerational work divisions. The structure of the
“new three-generation families” is sustainable,
stable, and reproducible. Therefore, it is likely to
remain the dominant rural family structure for the
next several decades.
(2) With its roots in the half-industrial and halfagricultural structure, the new three-generation
family is an inevitably incomplete family pattern
half of the family members are living in the
countryside, while the other half are constantly
working in the cities. It is this half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure that has led to the
incompleteness in both the lives and relationships
of family members. The incompleteness is not only

① The survey in central China shows that the “division of relatives”custom is still preserved in many villages, namely the duties of the parents family to visit
their relatives and friends are shared among the individual children’s families.
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the implication of such a family pattern, but also its
essential and natural property–the work divisions
and geographical separation between the old and the
young couples are the very causes of the “inseparable
family separations.”
(3) Technically, each small family of the
children’s generation would form a “new threegeneration family” with their parents. This is
different from the traditional three-generation
family composed of the parents and only one
son. Additionally, a small family of the children’s
generation is independent from their siblings both in
formas and social relationships.
(4) The new three-generation family is a kind
of inseparable family separation in financial terms.
They are de facto “separated” from the parents in
financial unit terms, while neither asset division nor
ceremonial “family division” has taken place. In this
sense, the parents’ and the children’s families are
financially independent.
(5) The duties of supporting their parents are
shared among all the children’s families, while the
parents are obliged to attend, nurture and support
the children’s families─a pattern different from the
traditional three-generation family, in which the
parents only shoulder the duties and responsibilities
to the son’s family with whom they are living
together, while assuming less obligations to the ones
that have moved out.
(6) With the value of “passing the merits and
fine traditions to the younger generations,” the
parents in a new three-generation family are closely
related to each offspring’s family. The parents
would make selfless contributions to and place great
expectations on their children’s families.
(7) Being highly flexible and adaptable in the
division of labor, the new three-generation families
can change their divisions according to various tasks
and life pressures at different times. For instance,
to get through the hard times, they will increase the

number of migrant workers by reducing the farming
members and transferring part of their lands, thus
increasing the incomes of the family. Likewise,
they will reclaim or buy some lands, have more
members return to the farms, and reduce the migrant
members (by asking the middle and old aged male
members to stop their industrial works or do parttime jobs) when the burdens have been lifted after
the completion of crucial life tasks.
Given these features, the comprehensive and
sustainable presence of the new three-generation
families have posed new implications and changes
on the social and economic lives in rural China.
(1) The concerted efforts by the children’s and
parents’ families have made the children’s families
more resilient to the risks inherent in the process
of urbanization and the rural social competitions,
helping the children’s families accomplish their
life and reproduction of labor powers at a “lower
cost”─they will be enabled to either support
their families in the cities, or lead a decent life
in the countryside. (2) The new three generation
family pattern mainly aims at facilitating the
migrant worker couples who are faced with social
competitions in the cities, instead of focusing on the
social lives of their parents at home. Therefore, the
rights and welfare of the old are easily neglected,
resulting in the de facto “exploitation” of the
parents by each child’s family. (3) As the parents are
included in different new three-generation families
of their children, they will need to be mindful of
the well-being of all the small families, which can
be overwhelming because of the mental stress from
the burdens of the children. They will be more
mentally stressed once they are disabled from work
as a result of sickness. (4) A new three-generation
family is naturally an incomplete family. Therefore,
it inevitably results in many social issues, such
as left-behind old and children. In such cases, the
old are probably unattended when they get sick or
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lose mobility, some will even suffer from mental
loneliness.
The new three-generation families are units of
strong resilience to competitions and risks which
would transfer many pressures resulting from
migrant couples and socialized competitions to
their parents, with the rights and welfare of the
latter being less focused and guaranteed than they
are deserved. The disadvantages of the new threegeneration families include; the parental thoughts
to reduce the burdens of their adult children, young
children being left behind, elders left unattended, the
sense of loneliness, among others (Yang & Ouyang,
2013). These have become the major causes of the
suicides of many rural old citizens in recent years.
4.2 Developing a huge middle-income group
The first wave of rich farmers accounted for
approximately 5% of all farmers in the vast rural
areas in central and western China. After building
their family’s fortunes by starting businesses or
engaging in trades, these farmers usually relocated
their families to urban areas. Another 15% included
the poor and the weak─including those with labor
deficits (mostly the elderly, weak, sick, disabled, and
the infants), the overburdened (who need to support
both the seniors and the juveniles), and the people
lacking land. This is the group that is unable to
obtain salary by going out as migrant workers, nor
can they earn extra by planting more farms. Another
10% of rural households are made up of those
operating “mainstay agriculture.” The remaining
70% are half-industrial and half-agricultural families
who are gaining incomes from both sectors. By
adding to the incomes and reducing expenditures,
the half-industrial and half-agricultural income
structure is enabling the farmers to have a decent
surplus.
Industrial incomes account for 60%─70%
of the total incomes of a half-industrial and halfagricultural family. The so-called industrial incomes
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here include incomes earned by working in factories,
construction sites, trading in the towns, and making
handcrafts. Most of the farmers are inclined to
working in factories and construction sites. Statistics
show that a typical young or middle-aged couple
can send home 15,000 yuan to 30,000 yuan of yearly
net incomes. Although couples going out together
usually result in higher costs in renting and daily
expenses, the couple will still have 20,000 yuan
to 30,000 yuan in their pockets when they come
home at the end of the year as long as they refrain
from some unrealistic urban consumer goods and
life styles. However, they might end up with 15,000
yuan. It is possible for most of them to come home
with around 20,000 yuan.
The incomes of the elderly might vary markedly
with their age and the amount of land they control.
Typically, a senior farmer aged between 50 to 65
is capable of tilling 10 mu of arable lands, making
roughly 10,000 yuan net income per year; while he
will have to reduce the lands once he is over 65 as he
will have neither the strength nor the energy for the
same amount of work, this senior farmer will still
make something between 3,000 yuan to 4,000 yuan
each year until he reaches 70, after that he will only
plant some vegetables and fruits on a small parcel of
land. He can always choose to raise some livestock
and poultry as part-time jobs, with which he will
exchange for some monetary incomes. All in all, it is
quite feasible for such a senior farmer to make 5,000
yuan to 15,000 yuan per year from agriculture.
With their industrial and agricultural incomes
combined, a new three-generation family usually get
their yearly income somewhere around 30,000 yuan,
which would make them one of the middle-income
families in rural China. Apart from the incomes,
the half-industrial and half-agricultural structure
also contributes to a huge amount of savings in four
aspects. First, instead of pursuing urban residency,
most of the young migrant couples are striving for
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a decent life at home. Therefore, they will not adopt
urban lifestyles in a real sense, nor will they indulge
themselves in the conspicuous consumption like the
urban middle class often do. Rather, they will save
most of their incomes for consumption at home,
where they can buy goods at relatively low prices.
By doing so, a considerable amount of savings is
achieved. Second, the elderly and children in halfindustrial and half-agricultural families usually live
in rural areas. it is a cost-effective way for these
families to support the elderly while they are alive
and give a proper funeral after they pass away
and reproduce the labor force─a large amount of
family expenditures is saved. Third, with the elderly
farming at home, a good number of expenditures are
not in monetary form, including grain, vegetables,
fruits, fish, and meats─all the sources of protein,
fiber, and energy are planted by the old, instead of
buying them with cash. For sure that the monetary
expenditures will increase should they need to
obtain these in cities; Fourth, all the recreation,
entertainment and social activities for both the old
and the juveniles are conducted within their villages,
meaning their consumption activities incurs no
expenditures. It is tempting to say that all these nonmonetary benefits are amounting to the invisible
welfare of farmers.
The half-industrial and half-agricultural
income structure and division of labor not only
help such a family earn more and spend less, but
also maintain their overall nutrition intake and
welfare consumption. The half-industrial and halfagricultural structure is making a farmer’s family
one of the households of middle-income and living
standards. Combining the other 10% or so “mid-scale
agriculture” farmers, there are surprisingly 80% of
rural families in the vast central and western China
that are above the bar of middle-incomes. That is a
significant social phenomenon which will absolutely
have its implications on the political and social lives

of rural China and which cannot be underestimated.
4.2.1 Acting as a social stabilizer in rural China
N o r m a l l y, C h i n a’s u r b a n i z a t i o n a n d
modernization echo with the out-flux of labor
forces, incomes, and resources from the rural areas.
Nonetheless, a huge group of middle-income rural
families has emerged, thanks to the half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure. That explains why
the process has not led to declining and unstable
rural areas. Despite the notable gap between the
middle-incomes in rural area and the middle or
high-income groups in the urban areas, the former
will never put themselves in the same coordinate
system with the latter in terms of their incomes
and consumption. Instead, they still compare and
compete with their counterparts at home. The clear
majority of rural families would engage in the social
competitions within their own villages─namely,
getting over the bar of middle-incomes will help
them win acknowledgment and approval of others,
preventing them from being isolated for being too
poor. Even those in underprivileged conditions
for the time being would not give up the hope
of prosperity as the bar of middle-income is not
something unreachable. On the other hand, the
middle-income level is more than sufficient to
guarantee a decent life, or even a “high welfare
life with low expenditures” at home (He, 2007).
By winning others’ approvals and living decent
lives with dignity, most of the rural residents would
feel satisfied with their lives. Additionally, the vast
amount of rural middle-income families approve
China’s overall political and social environments
and its policies, thanks to the merits provided by the
urban-rural dual structure, the half-industrial and
half-agricultural structure, and the national policies
to strengthen agriculture and benefit farmers. With
conservative mentalities, they would rather maintain
such half-industrial and half-agricultural life style
than make efforts to change it. It is these mentalities,
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their satisfaction and approval with the Communist
Party of China and the Chinese government that
are acting as the stabilizers of rural societies. A
survey I made indicates that most of the farmers are
not happy and are concerned with the aggressive
urbanization policies and massive farmland transfers
by local governments that are forcing farmers to
relocate into cities, meaning they can no longer plant
on the farmlands. The massive farmland transfers
driven by local governments have both facilitated
capital in rural China and throttled the small-scale
farming economies, forcing the half-industrial and
half-agricultural families to give up their farmlands.
The two policies have deprived the rural families
of both the explicit incomes and implicit welfare of
“agriculture.” As a result, their family incomes are
decreasing and pure monetary spending is rising,
meaning declining living standards and welfare of
the family. All these policies are destabilizing the
“stabilizers” in rural societies.
4.2.2 Playing their roles in the “de-stratification”
of rural societies
While differentiation among farmers is
witnessed by the vast rural societies in central and
western China, they are not seeing distinguishable
social stratum, let along isolation, repulsion, and
hatred between different stratums. That can be
explained by the de-stratification mechanism which
is present in the region. Specifically, the presence
of a huge group of middle-incomes generated by
the half-industrial and half-agricultural income
structure has laid the economic foundation of this
de-stratification mechanism. While the income
levels of most rural households are worse off than
some, they are also better off than many. The
consistent incomes will mirror with the similarity
and convergence among farmers in many aspects,
such as their rights, social relations, consumption
patterns, religious beliefs, and values. Moreover, the
living and consumption standards of the majority of
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middle-income families will constitute a reference
system, which, to the underprivileged 15% of
households in the same village, is not too challenging
to reach─after all, they will be isolated and left out
should they fail to reach that bar, meaning they will
become the “lower class” in real terms. In the light of
this, the likelihood of the farmers in a same village
being divided into various stratums of different ideas
and subjective identifications is low─the village will
remain a community of shared relations and ethics.
4.3 The mainstay farmers in rural China
Hardcore farmers refer to the group of farmers
who cultivate a moderate scale of farmland by
acquiring their farmlands against the half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure, or those who are
operating “mainstay agriculture” (He, 2004). The
share of mainstay farmers varies in different rural
regions, ranging from 5% in some mountain villages,
to 10%–15% in the Jianghan Plain. Most of the rural
regions have a share of mainstay farmers around
10%. Despite their small proportions, the group’s
roles and implications in the rural political and social
lives should not be underestimated. The roles played
by the mainstay farmers are closely related to their
social natures and positions in structures of the rural
society (Yang, 2013). Apart from the cultivators
of a moderate scale of farmlands, and the middleincomes in the village, the group of mid-level
farmers also feature the following aspects.
(1) Their interest is closely bound to the
farmlands, and their social relationships are in
the village. Mainstay farmers are committed to
agriculture since they are cultivating farmlands
of moderate scales. While they might engage in
some part-time jobs nearby during slack farming
seasons, the bulk of their incomes are made from
the lands they cultivate. Given the scale of economic
outputs delivered by the lands, it is less desirable
for them to become migrant workers. Thus, their
social relationships will be bound to the villages.
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With their core interest closely bound to the land,
mainstay farmers usually engage more actively
and energetically in the construction of rural
infrastructure. Likewise, with their major social
relationships bound to the village, they are the main
activists in the community and the main builders of
social relations. Compared with migrant workers,
the mainstay farmers better understand the diverse
needs and concerns of villagers as they are more
acquainted with the villages and the households.
(2) They have established har monious
relationships with all the groups in the villages.
First, the mainstay farmer gains access to the lands
transferred by other villagers as they have earned
the villagers’ friendship and trust in their capabilities
of having the lands well-cultivated, and in their
credibility that the lands will be returned when
required. Second, migrant workers usually take
the initiative to forge friendships with the mainstay
farmers, who are staying in the villages throughout
the year, and who would reach out to their leftbehind old and children in need. Third, the mainstay
farmers would take advantage of their ample slack
farming time to make acquaintance and socialize
with all the groups and households in the villages.
The mainstay farmers gain authority and prestige
as they actively take advantage of their ample slack
time to solve problems and relieve concerns for, and
conduct mutual beneficial cooperation with all the
farming groups.
(3) The mainstay farmers are the beneficiaries
of existing policies and regulations, including
the consistent rural land system, the land transfer
policies, and other preferential measures for the
farmers. These policies and measures provide many
advantages, such as access to lands of moderate
scale, middle incomes in rural China without being
migrant workers (which means they can enjoy
complete family lives), ample slack farming time,
and leisure times. Therefore, they are inevitably

mindful of the rural land policies adopted by the
Party and the Chinese government, and support the
existing rural land systems and transfer policies.
The mid-level farmer group is the output of
the half-industrial and half-agricultural structure.
No mid-level farmer will emerge without the
moderate scales of lands, which is only acquired
by gaining access to the lands transferred by the
migrant workers. Furthermore, it is the middle scales
of lands that have granted the mid-level farmers
corresponding properties and nature and specific
positions in the rural social structures, which have
further assigned them to corresponding roles in the
rural political and social lives– the hardcore.
4.4 Shaping an urbanization path with
Chinese characteristics
C h i n a h a s b e e n p r e s si n g a h e a d w it h
urbanization at an annual pace of 1% over the
past three decades. However, it has also witnessed
many issues over this exceptionally rapid course,
such as the impairment of farmers’ rights and
interests, forced evictions and demolitions, and
the “anti-moving” struggles. Despite this, China’s
urbanization is still progressing steadily and making
remarkable achievements as we prevented the
phenomena of “sheep devour men”─which had
forced numerous farmers in western countries
to loss their lands─and the massive slums in the
modern third world. China’s urbanization has not
been achieved by compromising the prosperity of its
vast rural areas. While successful migrant workers
managed to support their families and live happy
lives in urban areas, the less achieving ones are still
able to live decent lives in their home villages─this
is the so-called “urbanization path with Chinese
characteristics” (He, 2014).
Along the path of China’s urbanization, both
the successful ones who have managed to acquire
rural residency and the less achieving ones who are
returning to their home villages are shaped by the
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half-industrial and half-agricultural structure in the
rural areas. The significance of such a structure lies
in that it mitigates the migrant workers’ pressures
and burdens, while making them more resilient to
the risks in the cities. There is no point in elaborating
on “gaining urban residency” or “returning to
home villages” under the structural limits of
China’s industry mix and migrant workers income
levels should there be no half-industrial and halfagricultural structure.
4.4.1 The half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure provides strong backing for “the migrant
workers capable of gaining urban residency”
While it is a shared dream of farmers and
migrant workers to gain urban residency, only
10% of them will be fortunate enough to seize the
opportunity to move into cities and gain permanent
urban residency. Gaining an urban residency is no
easy mission. It is a prolonged and tough process
for every migrant worker, over the course of which
he/she will have to keep trying and constantly be
subject to the half-industrial and half-agricultural
divisions of works and income structures. (1) While
the migrant couples are striving for their urban
residency, it is of the utmost significance for them
to make a proper division of labor and cooperation
between generations. Most of the migrant workers
achieved this objective mainly by earning and
accumulating salaries, thus progressively acquiring
and gathering the economic and social capital
required to support their lives and family spending
in urban areas. Nonetheless, what cannot be
underestimated is the explicit and implicit benefits
of the old farming at home, which have not only
contributed to the migrant workers’ efforts for their
urban residency, but more importantly relieved their
burdens. The middle and old-aged have created a
steady “home” for the migrant workers “making
efforts” in the cities by attending farmlands,
taking care of their grandchildren, and supporting
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themselves later years. The migrant workers are thus
enabled to go forward with their burdens discarded.
Assume that the migrant workers must fight for
urban residency while supporting the elderly and
finishing labor force reproduction in the “high cost”
urban areas, their efforts for keeping a foothold
there would either be in vain or throttled when their
energy and capital are exhausted. (2) Even after
achieving what they have longed for, most of the
rural households retain their half-industrial and halfagricultural structure─namely, while the young
couples are living in the cities (half-industrial), their
parents still live their later years and pass away in
the villages (half-agricultural). Should the elderly
abandon agriculture and move into the cities, the
young couple would be forced to support the whole
family─which could have been supported by
incomes from both industry and agriculture─with
the sole income from their industrial salaries. In
this case, they will suffer from multiplied economic
stress and declining living standards. By having the
old live by themselves later years and pass away in
the villages, the migrant workers’ life spending will
be remarkably reduced, thus helping to support their
families and live decent lives in the cities.
4.4.2 The half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure has provided favorable environments
for those less achieving returning home migrant
workers
Up to 90% of farmers will not have the luck
or opportunities to gain urban residency. Their
experience of being migrant workers is accompanied
by multiple trips between the cities and their
villages. Eventually, they will end up coming back
to the rural areas. These farmers make multiple
attempts to gain their urban residency. They will
finally find it unrealistic after several attempts
and make the decision to return to their village. In
such cases, being a migrant worker has become
a method, instead of a purpose, for these farmers
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to acquire decent lives after they come back from
cities. During this course: (1) The old are providing
a crucial material basis for the homecoming migrant
workers and the precondition of them working in
the cities by cultivating their lands and looking after
the grandchildren. The couples will be less likely to
move into cities if their parents and children cannot
settle down at home. (2) The efforts the middle and
old aged farmers made to attend the lands, children,
and social relations in the villages, is the reason why
the migrant workers can still have “destinations” for
their homecoming. They will have “nowhere to go”
when they are forced to come back (e.g., when they
are laid off by financial crisis) if their parents also
moved into the cities. (3) One of the preconditions
for the half-industrial and half-agricultural structure
is the collective land ownership in the rural areas.
The lands will become the living guarantees of the
homecoming migrant workers after they have made
multiple trips between the cities and the villages (or
come back after being displaced). They will have
life journeys featured by half-industrial and halfagricultural experiences once they have (finally)
returned to agriculture─they have been industrial
workers at early ages and farmers in later years.
The savings from industrial works and the life
guarantees provided by their lands are sufficient for
them to live decent lives at home. In other words,
the half-industrial and half-agricultural structure in
rural China has enabled the farmers to “move out”
and “come back” during urbanization─they are
never concerned with the risk of becoming homeless
posed by a failed attempt for “urban residency.”

5. The half-industrial and halfagricultural structure as a mid-level
concept
As a descriptive concept, the half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure clearly describes and

outlines a series of common micro-phenomena in
today’s rural areas, including the inter-generational
division of labor, the industrial and agricultural
incomes of rural households, the vocational
differentiation of farmers, the multiple trips between
cities and villages made by migrant workers, and the
transfer and convergence of lands, etc. However, the
rural half-industrial and half-agricultural structure
is far more than a descriptive concept. It is also an
analytic, or a relational concept which describes the
prominence of the specific attributes of an object
series─in a word, it evaluates whether and how
much the elements are relevant to each other. A
descriptive concept only provides static descriptions
on all the elements of a phenomenon, instead of
explaining the correlations among them. In contrast,
an analytic concept provides dynamic statements on
the correlations among all elements. There are macro
and meso-analytic concepts. The former stands for
a highly abstract philosophical concept, and the
latter a mid-level concept that falls between a macro
and a micro concept. Focusing on general microsocial issues and proposing feasible and practical
theoretical hypothesis, a meso-analytic concept is
something factual and with value orientation. In
a word, the half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure captures the basic implications of a midlevel concept.
The half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure represents the organic combination
between its inherent phenomena and elements,
thus constituting a stable morphology carrying
its own mechanisms and logic. On one hand, the
rural half-industrial and half-agricultural structure
includes a series of phenomena it has described and
outlined, namely such a structure is the abstract
refinement of these micro-phenomena. On the
other hand, its inherent phenomena are to some
extent correlated logically with each other, which
means it is possible to infer other phenomena via
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the intermediate variables. Therefore, it is feasible to
raise a hypothesis and establish chain relationships
among phenomena, thus making arguments through
the phenomena and facts. Chain relationships refer
to the logical relationships among no less than three
phenomena. It is possible to construct at least several
pairs of chain relationships (see Figure 2).
(1) Constructing the chain relationship between
the new three-generation families and the farmers
for risk confrontation
The inter-generational division of labor is an
inherent phenomenon of the rural half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure in China. That the
old engage in agriculture and the young couples
work in cities constitutes the basic model of rural
inter-generational division of labor, leaving the rural
family structure in a long-term status of “inseparable
family separation,” which has resulted in the
common “new three-generation families” in today’s
rural areas. Such a pattern differentiates itself from
the traditional stem and joint families, nor does it

Figure 2 The half-industrial and half-agricultural structure as a mid-level concept
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resemble the nuclear family in western terms as it
ensures that a farmer’s family is jointly supported
by the three generations–who also stand shoulder to
shoulder to cope with the risks in the cities and the
social competitions at home.
(2) Constructing the chain relationship between
the middle incomes and the rural stabilizers. The
half-industrial and half-agricultural structure
families have incomes from both sectors, making
most of them the middle-incomes in rural China.
Being satisfied with their status quo, the conservative
rural middle incomes have laid concrete foundations
for the stability in rural China.
(3) Constructing the chain relationship between
gray hair agriculture and the rural families’
engagement in social competitions. The halfagricultural middle and old-aged, or the eldly
agriculture, is an integral part of the half-industrial
and half-agricultural structure. The gray hair
agriculture is crucial to the half-industrial and
half-agricultural families for cost-effective finish
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labor force reproduction and engagement in social
competitions.
(4) Constructing the chain relationship between
the features of mainstay agriculture and the deinvolution process. The half-industrial nature of
this structure implies that it is inevitable for some
rural families to transfer their lands to others. As
a result, the ones who acquired these lands will
have access to lands of moderate scale, forming
mainstay agriculture. With its focus on efficiency
and profitability of scale, mainstay agriculture
represents the tendency towards de-involution.
(5) Constructing the chain relationship between
the mainstay farmers and the reliant forces and
villages’ political structures. As the principal part
of mainstay agriculture, the hardcore farmers’
social nature and their unique positions in rural
social structures have made them a reliable force
for the Party and Chinese government to implement
their policies and regulations in the rural areas. The
mainstay farmers are vigorous players in the rural
political landscapes.
(6) Constructing the chain relationships between
the rural land systems and China’s urbanization
path. The rural collective ownership system is
the precondition to the half-industrial and halfagricultural structure. The farmers are enabled to go
back and forth between cities and villages as long as
they have lands at home.
Therefore, they would repeatedly make multiple
attempts to gain urban residency, instead of giving
up after one single failure. At the end of the day,
only a group of farmers who are more successful
will manage to settle down in the cities, while the
less achieving ones will return to their lands. During
this course, the half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure has demonstrated notable elasticity. In
other words, the farmers have the flexibility to seek
industrial jobs while they can, or return to their
lands. Farmers who are more capable will have

access to urban residency, and those less achieving
still have their access to industrial and agricultural
incomes, thus living decent lives at home─that is
China's unique urbanization path.
In these chain relationships, the rural halfindustrial and half-agricultural structure could either
be an intermediate variable or a primary variable,
from which other intermediate variables can be
derived. By doing this, the intermediate variables
will bridge all the phenomena and elements in a
logical manner, and form further explanation chains.
Moreover, other significant political, economic, and
social phenomena can be explained and set forth
through the permutations and combinations of their
inherent phenomena. In this sense, it makes sense to
define the rural half-industrial and half-agricultural
structure as an analytic middle range concept.
Specifically, the rural half-industrial and
half-agricultural structure is mostly defined as a
phenomenon reflecting the incomes and division of
labor of rural households in the existing analysis.
In-depth investigations have been conducted by
leveraging this definition. As a result, few analyses
have defined it as an analytic concept. This article
constitutes an attempt for the analysis of the rural
half-industrial and half-agricultural structure from
two dimensions: On the macro dimension, it proceeds
from the dissections and estimations of China’s
economic development in the long run, the income
levels of migrant workers, and the institutional urbanrural dual structure; on the micro level, it puts the
foothold on the elaboration and detailed analysis of
the differentiation of rural managing subjects, the
behavioral logic of farmers, and the work division
strategies of rural families. By capturing all the
phenomena–economic, social, political, family,
individual and their chain relationships, this concept
explains the diverse socioeconomic and sociopolitical
phenomena well in rural China.
(Translator: Wu Lingwei; Editor: Yan Yuting)
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